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Posts Tagged ‘Digital Forensics’
Monday, Sep 26th, 2011
Posted By Eoghan Casey


This year Eoghan Casey worked with Tim Vidas at Carnegie Mellon University and Matthew Geiger at CERT to create the DFRWS Forensics Challenge in an effort to advance forensic analysis of Android mobile devices. The winners of the challenge were Ivo Pooters, Steffen Moorrees and Pascal Arends from Fox-IT. Their submission provides a suite of utilities written in Python for extracting information from data acquired from Flash memory on Android devices. Complete results are posted on the DFRWS Web site.


The scenarios for the DFRWS 2011 Forensics Challenge were two seemingly unrelated crimes that turned out to be tightly linked with each other. The first scenario was a suspicious death and the goal of the investigation was to determine whether the victim killed himself or was murdered. The second scenario was an intellectual property theft case and the goal of the investigation was to document any evidence that intellectual property was stolen and to support termination of the suspected insider.


An interesting outcome of the challenge was that using dd to acquire data from the Android device in Scenario 1 did not copy the important information in out-of-band (OOB) areas of the YAFFS2 file system. As a result, it was not possible to reconstruct the file system. However, contestants were still able to carve out usable content from this data.


The winning submission provides a technical analysis of data structures found in memory dump from Android mobile devices and provides an Android analysis toolkit that extracts specific items and formats them in a report. Using this toolkit to perform a forensic examination of a full NAND dump of a YAFFS2 file system (such as in Scenario 2 of the DFRWS 2011 Forensics Challenge) first requires the file system to be mounted under Linux as an emulated Flash device (using nandsim).


A sample of the information extracted by the winners from the SQLite database located on the Android device in Scenario 2 (mtd8\data\com.android.providers.telephony\databases\mmssms.db) is provided here:

Address date/time (UTC) read type body
shandra@cheerful.com 05/06/2011 01:34:55 AM True in (Nearby! Coming for my beer) Hey Yob, I am closing in on Fat Heads. See ya soon.
sms.dynadel@gmail.com 05/06/2011 05:53:30 PM True in Reminder, planned IT outage this weekend. This maintenance window will start at 3 PM today and continue for approx 48 hours.
sms.dynadel@gmail.com 05/06/2011 05:55:16 PM True in This effects external services such as website, email, webmail, and the ftp server. Use the secondary email access and helpdesk # for emergencies
shandra@cheerful.com 05/07/2011 11:39:16 PM True in (Save me!) If Luke asks, I’m going out with you to dinner, OK?
I just can’t face Mr. Smooth tonight.
Shandra
6245 05/07/2011 11:44:27 PM True out Sure thing. Do you know where the wine loft is?
6245 05/07/2011 11:54:37 PM True out I ran into some friends at the double wide, meetup at 8:30 or so?
6245 05/07/2011 11:56:53 PM True out Or you can walk down Carson and join us


Much more information was extracted from both Android devices as detailed in the reports, which include an impressive graphical reconstruction of events.

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Tuesday, May 31st, 2011
Posted By Eoghan Casey

After six years of work, the expanded and updated third edition of Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet is now complete. The 800 printed pages and one online chapter cover the methods and tools relevant to incident responders, forensic analysts, police and lawyers.

Eoghan Casey - Digital Evidence & Computer Crime, 3rd Edition

Eoghan Casey - Digital Evidence & Computer Crime, 3rd Edition


This book is divided into five parts, beginning with the fundamental concepts and legal issues relating to digital evidence and computer crime in Part 1 (Digital Forensics: Chapters 1 – 5). Part 2 of this text (Digital Investigations: Chapters 6 – 9) covers investigative aspects of digital evidence and computer crime. Part 3 of this text (Apprehending Offenders: Chapters 10 – 14) deals with specific types of investigations with a focus on apprehending offenders, including Violent Crime in Chapter 10, Sex Offenders on the Internet in Chapter 12 and Investigating Computer Intrusions in Chapter 13. Part 4 of this book (Computer Forensics: Chapters 15 – 20) begins by introducing basic Forensic Science concepts in the context of a single computer, and goes on to apply these concepts in updated chapters dedicated to networked Windows, Unix, and Macintosh computers and mobile devices. Part 5 (Network Forensics: Chapters 21 – 25) covers computer networks from an investigative perspective, focusing specifically on the Internet and performing forensic analysis on network logs and traffic.


This material provides the foundation for the more advanced companion text, the Handbook of Digital Forensics and Investigation.


Many thanks to Susan Brenner, Christopher Daywalt, Monique Mattei Ferraro, Bert-Jaap Koops, Terrance Maguire, Mike McGrath, Tessa Robinson, Bradley Schatz, Ben Turnbull and Brent Turvey for their excellent contributions to this textbook.

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Wednesday, Mar 17th, 2010
Posted By Eoghan Casey

File initialization is a normal Windows file system behavior that can create problems for forensic analysts. We have encountered file initialization behaviors in a number of cases and find that it creates significant confusion if the underlying cause is not understood. In several cases, incomplete file initialization was misinterpret as backdating, and in another matter it hampered data salvaging efforts.



File Initialization
File initialization is a process that Microsoft Windows uses when creating a new file system entry. Basically, when a new file is being created, an appropriate amount of unallocated space is reserved for the data that will be stored in the new file. Under certain circumstances, the storage space reserved for the new file may not be used in its entirety, or at all.


When only a portion of the disk space that was reserved for a new file is used to store data associated with that file, this leaves a discrepancy between the logical file size and the actual amount of data stored in the file. As a result, you can have a file that appears to have a logical size larger than the actual amount of data stored for that file. The space between the end of valid data and the end of file is called uninitialized space.

    “In NTFS, there are two important concepts of file length: the End of File (EOF) marker and the Valid Data Length (VDL). The EOF indicates the actual length of the file. The VDL identifies the length of valid data on disk. Any reads between VDL and EOF automatically return 0 in order to preserve the C2 object reuse requirement.” (Microsoft fsutil documentation)





Uninitialized space is similar in concept to file slack except that it is contained within the logical file size. Unlike file slack which is no longer associated with a file, data in uninitialized space is in a kind of limbo, trapped at the end of an allocated file but not actually part of that file.

Uninitialized Diagram

Figure: Diagram of file with a logical size that is larger than its valid data length, leaving uninitialized space


The effect of file initialization behaviors are most easily demonstrated on Windows XP with fsutil as shown here. First, we create a new file that can contain 1024 bytes:


    C:\Test>fsutil file createnew cmdLabs-setvaliddata 1024
    File C:\Test\cmdLabs-setvaliddata is created


Then we set the valid data length of the new file to 1000 bytes, which leaves 24 bytes unused at the end of the file.

    C:\Test>fsutil file setvaliddata cmdLabs-setvaliddata 1000

    Valid data length is changed

NTFS captures the difference between logical file size and valid data length in two MFT fields as shown here:


MFT Entry

Figure:MFT entry with logical size and valid data length viewed using X-Ways Forensics



Salvaging Data from File System Limbo
The significance of this from a forensic analysis standpoint is that a file with a valid data length smaller than the logical file size can contain data associated with two files: data associated with the new file (VDL bytes), and data from the old file in uninitialized space (logical file size – VDL bytes).



From a forensic analysis perspective, this uninitialized space can be beneficial. While various disk cleaning utilities can be configured to wipe file slack, they generally do not touch data in uninitialized space. As a result, deleted data can remain in uninitialized space indefinitely, even despite data destruction efforts, and can be salvaged by forensic analysts.



However, this arrangement of data can create complications for forensic analysts, particularly when dealing with larger files that have substantial amounts of uninitialized space. For instance, when carving for certain file types, it is common to export unallocated space. However, any data in uninitialized space will not be included in unallocated space. Similarly, when performing keyword searches, a forensic analyst could incorrectly attribute a hit in the uninitialized space with the new file.



In one case, several approaches were employed in an effort to salvage video fragments:

  • examined deleted video files still referenced by file system
  • performed file carving on unallocated space only
  • processed file slack only for fragments of video files

None of these approaches recovered videos from a time period of interest. It was not until we conducted a forensic analysis of uninitialized space that additional video fragment were found.



Misinterpreting Normal File System Behavior as Backdating

Another complication from a forensic analysis standpoint arises when the file creation process is interrupted before the contents of the file is written to disk, because the new file system entry will point to a cluster that still contains data associated with an older file. When this occurs and a date can be associated with the older file, forensic analysts might think that a newer file was overwritten by an older one. This phenomenon can be misinterpreted as evidence of backdating.


As an example, consider a newly created file that has not been initialized and has not had any associated data saved to disk as shown here using fsutil:

    C:\Test>fsutil file createnew cmdLabs-creatnew 1024
    File C:\Test\cmdLabs-creatnew is created



When a file is initialized but the associated contents was not written to disk, the initialized file system entry may point to a cluster that contains old data as shown below using EnCase. By default, EnCase shows uninitialized space in blue text. The cluster that was allocated to the new file “cmdLabs-createnew” contains older data (folder entries of files from earlier in January).




fsutils file initialization example

Figure: EnCase showing folder entries from early January in the cluster allocated to the new initialized file system entry


This situation can be misinterpreted as backdating if the forensic analyst assumes that the clock had to be set back to the old date when the file contents was saved to disk.

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Wednesday, Feb 3rd, 2010
Posted By Eoghan Casey

At long last and with the help of many talented experts, I have put together a new Handbook. This book provides an advanced reference for conducting digital investigations and performing forensic examinations. The first part of the book provides comprehensive methodologies and practical tips from experienced practitioners in the areas of forensic analysis, electronic discovery and intrusion investigation. The second part of the book delves into technical aspects of digital evidence on computers, networks, and embedded systems. The technologies covered include Windows, UNIX, and Macintosh computers, cellular telephones and other mobile devices, networks and mobile telecommunications technology.


The Network Investigations chapter written by cmdLabs personnel is available in PDF form upon request.


F-Response is giving a copy of the Handbook with purchase of their tool:
Buy F-Response, Get a copy of The Handbook of Digital Forensics and Investigation



Handbook

My deepest thanks to the contributors: Cory Altheide (Mandiant) – Christopher Daywalt (cmdLabs) – Andrea de Donno (Lepta) – Dario Forte (DFLabs) – James Holley (Ernst & Young) – Andy Johnson (University of Maryland, Baltimore County) – Ronald van der Knijff (Netherlands Forensic Institute) – Anthony Kokocinski (CSC) – Paul Luehr (Stroz Friedberg) – Terrance Maguire (cmdLabs) – Ryan Pittman (US Army) – Curtis Rose (Curtis W. Rose & Associates) – Joseph Schwerha (TraceEvidence) – Dave Shaver (US Army) – Jessica Reust Smith (Stroz Friedberg).

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